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This project has been a joy to work on. Cameron, Eklund, Hofweber, Linnebo, Russell
and Sider wrote six splendid essays, filled with interesting ideas and thoughtful criticism.
I cannot thank them enough.
The essays overlap in interesting ways, so I decided to organize my replies themati-
cally, rather than writing a separate reply for each critic. There are three main headings:
‘World and Language’, ‘World’ and ‘Language’.
1 World and Language
1.1 Compositionalism (Eklund)
Much of the book is premised on compositionalism: a doctrine about the relationship
between our language and the world it represents.
The basic idea behind compositionalism is straightforward. Let L be an uninterpreted
first-order language, and consider an assignment of truth-conditions to sentences in L.
Our assignment must respect logical entailments,1 but we are otherwise allowed to pick
any assignment we like. According to compositionalism, each of the following claims is
true:
1We require, in particular, that if ψ is a logical consequence of φ, then the truth conditions assigned
to φ must demand at least as much of the world as the truth-conditions assigned to ψ. (See The
Construction of Logical Space, Section 1.3 for a more detailed constraint.) I assume that we are operating
with a negative free logic, so as to avoid trivializing the condition on reference that is mentioned below.
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C1 Should one stipulate that the sentences of L are to be interpreted on the basis of
the chosen assignment of truth conditions, there is nothing to stop the stipulation
from rendering the vocabulary in L meaningful, and doing so in such a way that
each sentence of L comes to have its assigned truth-conditions.
C2 When the sentences of L are so interpreted, all it takes for a singular term t of L
to refer to an object in the world—all it takes for t to be non-empty—is for the
world to satisfy the truth-conditions that were assigned to p∃x(x = t)q (or some
inferential analogue).
What makes compositionalism a substantial view is that the constraints it imposes on a
possible assignment of truth-conditions are so very weak. Suppose, for example, that L
contains singular terms of the form ‘direction?(t)’. It follows from C1 that—as long as
we are careful to respect logical entailments—there is nothing to stop us from stipulating
that ‘direction?(a) = direction?(b)’ is to be true just in case line a is parallel to line
b. Moreover, on the most natural way of extending this assignment to other sentences
of the language,2 the sentence ‘∃x(x = direction?(a))’ gets assigned the truth-condition
that there be a line identical to a. And since this condition will be satisfied by the world
as long as line a exists, it follows from C2 that the term ‘direction?(a)’ will refer to an
2One can stipulate that a sentence φ of L is to have the same truth-conditions as its ‘nominalization’
[φ]N , where nominalizations are defined as follows:
• [pdirection?(a) = direction?(b)q]N = pa is parallel to bq.
• [pxi = direction?(a)q]N = pzi is parallel to aq.
• [pxi = xjq]N = pzi is parallel to zjq.
• [p∃xi(φ)q]N = pthere is a line zi such that ([φ]N )q.
• [pφ ∧ ψq ]N = the conjunction of [φ]N and [ψ]N .
• [p¬φq]N = the negation of [φ]N .
This assignment of truth-conditions is not defined for every sentence of the language. And, in particular,
it is not defined for ‘mixed’ identity statements, such as ‘a = direction?(a)’. Although this could easily
be remedied by treating mixed identities as false, an important feature of compositionalism is that it does
not presuppose that the vocabulary in L can only be meaningful if every sentence in L has well-defined
truth-conditions. (See The Construction of Logical Space, Sections 1.3 and 3.2.)
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object in the world as long as a exists—or, as a speaker of L might put it: if a exists,
then so does its direction?.
Here then is the picture of the relationship between language and the world that
compositionalism delivers. To render a language meaningful is to decide which ways
for the world to be are to be associated with which sentences. The world determines
which sentences are true, by determining which ways for the world to be are actualized.
But there is no need for the world to be, in some sense, ‘responsive’ to a sentence’s
compositional structure in order to make it true. Compositional structure matters to
truth only insofar as it determines logical entailments between sentences, and thereby
limits the ways in which one’s decision to associate some ways for the world to be with
some sentences can coexist with one’s decision to associate other ways for the world to
be with other sentences. The issue of whether a singular term refers is determined by
the compositional structures that one chose to associate with ways for the world to be
that turn out to be actualized. (If one wanted to describe this picture with a slogan, one
might say that compositionalism is the view that our language only makes contact with
the world at the level of sentences.3)
In his contribution to the volume, Matti Eklund complains that the full composition-
alist picture ‘doesn’t actually seem to be stated in the theses used to officially characterize
compositionalism’ (p. xx). I’m embarrassed to report that he is right. Although the of-
ficial statement of compositionalism in the book entails a version of [C2] above, I left
out [C1]. This obscures the ensuing discussion, which tacitly presupposes that [C1] is in
place.
[C1] tells us that the vocabulary of an uninterpreted language can be rendered mean-
ingful in in such a way that its sentences get assigned arbitrarily chosen truth-conditions—
arbitrarily chosen, except for the requirement that logical entailments be respected. As
3I am not, of course, the first to articulate a version of this view. See Frege, Die Grundlagen der
Arithmetik ; Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language; Wright, Frege’s Conception of Numbers; Rosen,
‘The Refutation of Nominalism (?)’.
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I point out in the book, there is a simple technical result that shows that if a theory is
internally coherent, then it is possible to find an assignment of truth-conditions to sen-
tences in the language that respects logical entailments and assigns trivially-satisfiable
truth-conditions to every sentence of the theory (§8.2). So it follows from [C1] that
as long as the theory is initially regarded as uninterpreted, its vocabulary can be ren-
dered meaningful in such a way that each sentence in the theory gets assigned trivially
satisfiable truth-conditions.
Eklund objects that the version of this argument I present in the book is unsound:
‘Everyone agrees that consistent (coherent, conservative) theories have models; the ques-
tion concerns whether a pure mathematical theory’s satisfying the requirement suffices
for it to be true.’ (pp xx). I think Eklund is quite right to issue this complaint. The
argument is only sound in the presence of [C1], and [C1] was never made explicit in the
text.
1.2 Numbers (Hofweber, Sider)
Trivialism is the view that the truths of pure mathematics have trivial truth-conditions:
truth-conditions whose satisfaction requires nothing of the world. Since it is a truth of
pure mathematics that numbers exist, trivialism entails that the requirement that the
world contain numbers would be satisfied trivially, regardless of the way the world turned
out to be.
In the book I motivate Trivialism by making a case for the following claim:
[Dinosaurs]
For the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs.
and, more generally,
[Numbers]
For the number of the F s to be n just is for it to be the case that ∃!nx(Fx).
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[Numbers] helps motivate Trivialism because it not only entails that numbers exist. It
entails that they exist on pain of contradiction. (Proof: Suppose there are no numbers; by
[Numbers], the number of numbers is zero; so zero exists; so numbers exist; contradiction!)
But if a world with no numbers would be inconsistent—and therefore absurd—there is
no particular way our world would need to be in order to make it the case that numbers
exist. So the demand that the world contain numbers is a demand that will be satisfied
trivially.
According to the account of ‘just is’-statements that I develop in chapters 1 and 2
of the book, the way to decide whether to accept a ‘just is’-statement is to perform a
cost-benefit analysis. The benefit of accepting [Numbers] is that one would be left with
no theoretical gap between there being n F s and the number of the F s being n, so one
would no longer need to seek a justification for transitioning from the one to the other;
the cost is that one has fewer theoretical resources to work with, since one loses the
distinction between worlds with n F s and worlds in which the number of the F s is n.
What I suggest in the book (§§1.3, 3.0) is that the the benefits of accepting [Numbers]
far outweigh the costs, and that [Numbers] should therefore be accepted.
As Ted Sider points out, however, this is potentially misleading: there is an important
sense in which my ‘account of mathematical truth does not, in fact, rely on a cost-benefit
argument for the truth of [Numbers].’ (p xx) The reason is that in the book I also set
forth a semantic theory for the language of arithmetic, and this theory guarantees that
[Numbers] is correct.
My primary goal in advancing the semantic theory—the Trivialist Semantics, as I
call it—was to give proper articulation of Mathematical Trivialism. I wanted a precise
statement of the truth-conditions that a trivialist thinks should be associated with each
sentence in the language of arithmetic (and, more generally, with each sentence in the
language of set theory). As Thomas Hofweber points out (p. xx), this is easily done
in the case of pure mathematics, since the trivialist can give a precise statement of the
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proposal by claiming that true sentences have trivial truth-conditions and false sentences
have impossible truth-conditions. But the task is considerably more difficult when it
comes applied mathematics.4
Just because one is able to articulate a semantic theory for the language of arithmetic,
it doesn’t follow that the semantic theory is correct. One needs some sort of argument
for thinking that the assignment of truth-conditions that is delivered by the theory cor-
responds to the actual truth-conditions of sentences in one’s object-language. Since the
Trivialist Semantics is a generalization of the idea that what it takes for ‘the number
of the F s = n’ to be true is for there to be exactly n F s, the cost-benefit analysis of
[Numbers] is one such argument.
The reason I nonetheless think that Sider is right when he suggests that the appeal to
[Numbers] is inessential is that, as I argue in chapters 3 and 4, the Trivialist Semantics
can be used as the basis of an attractive philosophy of mathematics, and it seems to me
that this is supplies powerful grounds for taking it to be correct, regardless of whether
one has an independent argument for [Numbers].
1.3 Outscoping (Sider)
The Trivialist Semantics entails a semantic clause for each sentence in the language of
arithmetic, a clause that specifies a suitable ‘trivialist’ truth-condition. What do such
clauses look like? One might have expected to see something along the following lines:
(1) ‘the number of the dinosaurs = 0’ is true at w ↔ [there are no dinosaurs]w
When [. . .]w is read ‘at w, it is the case that . . . ’, (1) tells us that what would be required
of world w for ‘the number of the dinosaurs = 0’ to count as true at w is for w to contain
4In the case of applied set-theory, the only way of doing so that I know of is by way of the compositional
semantics that I develop in The Construction of Logical Space, Section 3.4.1. In the case of applied
arithmetic, it can be done either by way of the compositional semantics described in Section 3.3 or by
way of the non-compositional procedure described in Section 8.2.3. It seems to me, however, that the
compositional semantics is vastly more illuminating than its non-compositional counterpart.
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no dinosaurs. We can therefore think of (1) as assigning to ‘the number of the dinosaurs
= 0’ the truth-condition that there be no dinosaurs.
Sadly, there are powerful reasons for thinking that no effectively specifiable seman-
tic theory could entail a trivialist clause in the style of (1) for every sentence in the
language. The problem is that such a theory would require the existence of a trivialist
paraphrase-function: a function that assigns to each sentence φ of the object-language a
metalinguistic sentence that uncontroversially expresses the truth-conditions that a triv-
ialist would wish to associate with φ. And there is a formal result that suggests that
there can be no such paraphrase-function: arithmetical truth is just too complex.5
Fortunately, the trivialist can get around the problem by availing herself of a de-
vice I call ‘outscoping’. Instead of specifying truth-conditions by appeal to a trivialist
paraphrase-function, as in (1), the trivialist can use clauses of the following kind:
(2) ‘the number of the dinosaurs = 0’ is true at w ↔ the number of z such that
[x is a dinosaurs]w = 0.
The crucial thing to notice about (2) is that even though it contains mathematical vo-
cabulary in its right-hand side, the mathematical vocabulary has all been placed outside
the scope of [. . .]w: it has all been ‘outscoped’. The result is that (2) ends up delivering
the same trivialist specification of truth conditions as (1).6 They both assign to ‘the
number of dinosaurs = 0’ the truth-condition that there be no dinosaurs.
Moreover, since (2) does not rely on a trivialist paraphrase-function, it does not
fall pray to the formal result I mentioned earlier. In fact, it is easy to characterize
a compositional semantics that entails suitably outscoped semantic clauses for every
sentence of the language of pure and applied arithmetic—and, indeed, pure and applied
set-theory—and does so in a way that yields a trivialist specification of truth-conditions.7
5The Construction of Logical Space, Ch. 7.
6To keep things simple, I assume that the range of our metalingusitic variables in (2) includes merely
possible objects. One can, however, avoid this assumption by appeal to the machinery in The Construc-
tion of Logical Space, Ch. 6.
7The Construction of Logical Space, Section 3.3.
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That is the Trivialist Semantics.
As Sider points out, outscoping suffers from an important shortcoming: it is limited
in its ability to address ‘discourse-threat’ (p. xx). I will illustrate the point by considering
three different kinds of discourse-threat.
Consider, first, a mathematical nihilist : someone who thinks that mathemetical vo-
cabulary is meaningless. An outscoped semantic clause such as (2) would do nothing to
convince the nihilist that ‘the number of the dinosaurs = 0’ is, in fact, meaningful. For
she would take the clause itself to be meaningless, on the grounds that its right-hand side
contains arithmetical vocabulary. Notice, in contrast, that the nihilist would be moved
by a paraphrase-function that mapped each mathematical statement to a ‘nominalistic’
counterpart.
Next, consider a mathematical indeterminist : someone takes mathematical vocabu-
lary to be meaningful and is happy to engage in ordinary mathematical practice but who
thinks that certain mathematical sentences are neither true nor false: the Continuum
Hypothesis, as it might be. As before, our outscoped semantic clauses would do nothing
to convince the indeterminist of the determinacy of a sentence that she previously re-
garded as indeterminate. The easiest way to see this is to note that when φ is a sentences
of pure mathematics, the trivialist semantics will deliver a semantic clause in which all
vocabulary has been outscoped:
(3) φ is true at w ↔ p and [>]w.
(where ‘>’ is replaced by a tautology and ‘p’ is replaced by a metalinguistic version
of φ)
When φ is the Continuum Hypothesis, the resulting version of (3) gives us two pieces
of information. It tells us that if there is no set whose cardinality is strictly between
that of the integers and that of the reals, then the Continuum Hypothesis has trivially
satisfiable truth conditions (because it will be true at w, regardless of how w happens to
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be). And it tells us that if there is a set whose cardinality is strictly between that of the
integers and that of the reals, then the Continuum Hypothesis has trivially unsatisfiable
truth conditions (because it will be false at w, regardless of how w happens to be). This
means that (3) is not entirely inert: it entails that the Continuum Hypothesis has truth-
conditions that are either trivially satisfiable or trivially unsatisfiable. But this is no help
to our indeterminist. For if she thinks that there is no fact of the matter as to whether
there is a set whose cardinality is strictly between that of the integers and that of the
reals, (3) will give her no reason to change her mind.
The third kind of discourse-threat I would like to consider is the one that Sider is
most interested in. Consider a skeptic who wonders ‘whether reality contains enough to
tie down discourse about causation, morality, or mathematics’ (p. xx). She believes, in
particular, that reality must somehow ‘underwrite’ mathematical truth, and worries that
‘[none] of the facts that have been proposed as underlying mathematical truth are wholly
comfortable to accept: facts about ‘Platonic entities’, infinitely many concrete objects,
primitive modal facts, primitive facts about fictional truth, primitive higher-order facts,
and so on. And it’s natural to worry that in the absence of all such underwriting facts,
there would be massive indeterminacy in mathematical statements.’ (p. xx)
Sider suggests that in a situation like this ‘using outscoping won’t give us what we
want: a guarantee that reality adequately ties down the discourse’ (p. xx). I agree that
outscoping does not deliver a new class of facts with which to underwrite mathematical
discourse: an alternative to platonic entities, or infinitely many concrete objects, or any
of the other potentially underwriting facts on Sider’s list. It seems to me, however, that
the kind of discourse-threat we are concerned with here is unlike the kinds of discourse-
threat we discussed earlier in an important respect. For in this case outscoping does
deliver a result that is capable of engaging the skeptic—not by giving the skeptic what
she wants, but by showing that the her demands are unreasonable.
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The reason is straightforward. If the Trivialist Semantics I propose is along the right
lines, then pure mathematics is simply not in need of underwriting. If the truths of pure
mathematics have trivially satisfiable truth-conditions, then there are no constraints that
reality would have to satisfy in order to ‘tie down’ the relevant discourse. The truths of
pure mathematics are like the truths of pure logic: they are not the sorts of things that
need to be tied down. (For further discussion of this issue, see footnote 20.)
Sider has a nice analogy, which can be used to shed further light on the question of
what outscoping can and cannot do:
Since Rayo is inclined to reject talk of metaphysical structure (because of
the apparently unanswerable questions such talk raises), he doesn’t indulge
in such talk. But some of us do; and Rayo presumably suspects that our
discourse about metaphysical structure is massively indeterminate, or projec-
tive of our emotions, or is in some other way a failure. However exactly he
conceptualizes this failure, he will want to deny that mathematical discourse
fails in the same way. He therefore has as much reason as anyone to want an
answer to discourse-threat in mathematics. (p. xx)
Sider is right about my suspicions: I worry that our best theorizing about metaphysical
structure might fail to determine well-defined truth-conditions for sentences contain-
ing talk of metaphysical structure. More importantly, I think Sider is right about the
challenge I face. Since I am happy to indulge in talk of mathematical objects, I am com-
mitted to thinking that mathematical sentences, unlike metaphysical-structure sentences,
do have well-defined truth-conditions (or at least that enough mathematical sentences
have truth-conditions that are well-enough defined to make mathematical practice worth-
while).
But it seems to me that the Trivialist Semantics supports just that conclusion. For it
can be used to identify a precise assignment of truth-conditions for every theorem of pure
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or applied mathematics (and for the negation of every such theorem). It can be used, for
example, to identify perfectly determinate truth-conditions to ‘2+2=4’; specifically: the
trivially satisfiable truth-conditions.
Here I am presupposing that one is prepared to use mathematics in the metatheory.
In order to establish that ‘2+2=4’ has trivial truth-conditions, for example, one has
to prove that 2+2=4 in the metatheory. But—and this is the crucial point—nobody
is in any serious doubt about whether 2+2=4. So nobody should be in any serious
doubt about the truth-conditions that the trivialist semantics associates with ‘2+2=4’.
What the trivialist semantics does, in other words, is transform our ability to engage
in mathematical practice into an ability to identify uncontroversially determinate truth
conditions for mathematical statements.
In contrast, I know of no procedure that I could use to satisfy myself that sentences
about metaphysical structure have well-defined truth-conditions. The difference between
the two cases is partly to do to the dialectical situation: whereas no philosopher would
seriously see herself as unable to engage in mathematical practice, some of us have genuine
doubts about our ability to engage in the practice of metaphysical-structure talk. It is
worth keeping in mind, however, that there is also a difference that has nothing to do
with the dialectical situation: as far as I know, there is no analogue of the trivialist
semantics for the discourse concerning metaphysical structure. There is no procedure
that would allow us to transform an ability to engage in the practice into an ability to
identify fully determinate truth-conditions for the relevant statements.
1.4 Explanatory Danglers (Linnebo)
Øystein Linnebo has a complaint that is in some ways related to Sider’s idea that arith-
metical truth needs to be ‘tied down’ by reality.
He asks us to consider a semantics for the language of arithmetic in which truth-
conditions are determined non-compositionally. Instead, they are ‘determined by syntac-
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tically characterized calculations that are performed on [arithmetical] expressions’ (p xx).
In the case of an arithmetical truth such as ‘2 + 1 = 3’, for example, the relevant calcu-
lations might produce the sequence: 2 + 1 = 3, (2 + 0)′ = 2′, 2′ = 1′, 1′ = 0′′, 0′′ = 0′′, >.
One can then take the truth-conditions of the original sentence to be the truth-conditions
of the last member of the sequence, which in this case is a tautology.
Linnebo then suggests the following diagnosis:
On the envisaged semantics, the assignment of reference to arithmetical sin-
gular terms drops out as irrelevant to the truth of arithmetical sentences. If
such terms can be said to refer at all (which I doubt), then their referents will
play no role in the explanation of the truth of arithmetical sentences in which
the terms occur. Numbers would thus at best be left as explanatory danglers,
utterly irrelevant to the truth of sentences that appear to be about numbers.
A view that so completely undermines the analogy between mathematical
and non-mathematical truth does not deserve to be classified as platonist.’
A compositionalist would disagree with Linnebo about whether the relevant terms should
be taken to refer. For the compositionalist’s condition [C1] (from Section 1.1) guarantees
that Linnebo’s procedure can, in fact, be used to specify truth-conditions to arithmetical
sentences. And, on any reasonable way of spelling out the details,8 sentences of the form
‘∃x(x = k)’ will be assigned trivial truth-conditions. So it follows from condition [C2]
that numerals are non-empty: they genuinely refer to objects in the world.
What should our compositionalist make of Linnebo’s claim that numbers would then
be ‘explanatory danglers, utterly irrelevant to the truth of sentences that appear to be
about numbers’?
An analogy might be helpful. Consider the specification of truth-conditions to direc-
tion?-statements that I described in Section 1.1. Nowhere in this specification did I make
8See, for instance, The Construction of Logical Space, Section 7.4.
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use of an assignment of reference to direction?-terms. What I did instead was supply a
syntactic recipe for transforming each direction?-sentence into a line-sentence—a recipe
that is in some ways analogous to Linnebo’s syntactic recipe for transforming arithmetical
truths into tautologies—and used the end point of the transformation to specify truth-
conditions for the original sentence. I then noted that the compositionalist would claim
that, as long as line a exists, ‘the direction? of a’ will be a genuinely referential singular
term (and therefore that if a exists, so will its direction?).
A critic might take her cue from Linnebo, and claim that the resulting Platonism
about directions? isn’t worthy of the name, on the grounds that ‘the assignment of refer-
ence to direction?-terms drops out as irrelevant to the truth of the direction?-sentences’.
But the compositionalist would see this as a mistake. For if language only makes contact
with the world at the level of sentences (Section 1.1), the adequacy of a semantic theory
cannot possibly depend on whether it proceeds by carrying out a syntactic transformation
rather than by assigning referents to singular terms. The details of one’s specification
of truth-conditions won’t matter, as long as they deliver the right assignment of truth-
conditions to sentences.
Notice, moreover, that a speaker of the direction?-language would claim that directions?
are not irrelevant to the truth of direction?-statements. She would claim, for example,
that what is required of the world for ‘∃x (x = the direction? of a)’ to be true is for the
direction? of a to exist, and go on to conclude that how things stand with directions? is
exactly what matters to the truth of direction?-statements. (She would, of course, also
claim that what is required of the world for ‘∃x (x = the direction? of a)’ to be true is
for line a to exist. But this is as it should be, since our speaker believes that all it takes
for the direction? of a to exist is for line a to exist.)
The lesson of all this is that, from the compositionalist’s point of view, it would be
a mistake to conclude anything about whether a singular term refers—or about whether
its referent would be relevant to the truth of sentences in which it occurs—from the
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manner in which truth-conditions for the relevant sentences were specified. In particular,
it would be a mistake to conclude that the referents of arithmetical terms are ‘explanatory
danglers’ from the fact that one uses a particular syntactic procedure to specify truth-
conditions for arithmetical sentences.
Since we have been seeing things from the perspective of a compositionalist, our
discussion is best understood as a defensive maneuver: it is aimed at showing that if
you start out as a compositionalist, then you’ll be able to resist Linnebo’s argument.
But, of course, one might claim that Linnebo’s critique is best read not as an effort
to get the compositionalist to change her ways, but as a warning to the uncommitted:
‘yield to compositionalism’—the warning would go—‘and you’ll end up with a version of
Platonism unworthy of the name.’ It is not clear to me, however, that we have a neutral
standpoint from which to assess such a warning. For it is hard to separate the question of
how best to think of Platonism from the question of whether compositionalism is correct.
If the warning is to have force, it seems to me that it needs to be accompanied by an
independent argument against compositionalism.9
1.5 Identity and Absolute Generality (Eklund, Russell)
Our discussion of compositionalism in section 1.1 was focused on the special case of
uninterpreted languages. But one could defend a version of the same idea for cases in
which one starts with an interpreted language and uses a linguistic stipulation to render
meaningful a certain extension of the language.
As before, the compositionalist will claim that as long as the proposed specification
of truth-conditions respects logical entailments, there is nothing to stop it from being
successful. And, as before, she will claim that all it takes for a term t of the extended
language to refer is for the world to satisfy the truth-conditions that have been associated
9For more on Linnebo’s views on the relationship between our language and the world it represents,
see Linnebo ‘Reference by Abstraction’.
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with p∃x(x = t)q (or some inferential analogue). In this case, however, she will insist
that the our assignment of truth-conditions be conservative: that it respect the truth-
conditions that had been previously associated with sentences of the original language.10
Suppose, for example, that one starts with a language containing no mathematical
vocabulary, and that one sets out to enrich it with arithmetical terms. One way to do so
would be to think of the extended language as a two-sorted language, in which arithmeti-
cal predicates are only allowed to take arithmetical terms as arguments, and in which
non-arithmetical predicates are only allowed to take non-arithmetical terms as argu-
ments. One can then stipulate that a sentence built from purely arithmetical vocabulary
is to have trivially satisfiable truth-conditions if it follows from the Dedekind-Peano Ax-
ioms, and trivially unsatisfiable truth-conditions if its negation follows from the axioms.
When further details spelled out in the right kind of way,11 this delivers an entailment-
preserving specification of truth-conditions which is conservative over sentences of the
original language. So from the compositionalist’s point of view, one will have succeeded
in extending the original language to contain the language of (pure) arithmetic.
And, of course, the procedure is quite general. For any language L and any theory
of pure mathematics T , one can extend L by adding the vocabulary of T and treating
the terms of T and L as corresponding to different sorts. As before, the compositionalist
will think that one can go on to render the extended language meaningful in a way that
delivers trivially satisfiable truth-conditions to the axioms of the theory while respecting
the truth-conditions of sentences in the original language.12
In describing this sort of idea in the book, I usually worked on the assumption that
10For further discussion, see The Construction of Logical Space, Section 8.2.3.
11Here are the details. Let φ be an arbitrary sentence of the extended language, let w be a world, and
let Ow be the set of sentences containing no new vocabulary that are true at w, let ν be the sentence
∀x∀n(x 6= n) (where x is a variable of the non-arithmetical sort and n is a variable of the arithmetical
sort). Then perform the following stipulations: (1) φ is to be counted as true at w just in case it is a
logical consequence of Ow ∪ {ν} together with the Dedekind-Peano Axioms; (2) φ is counted as false
at w just in case its negation is a logical consequence of Ow ∪ {ν} together with the Dedekind-Peano
Axioms; and (3) φ is otherwise counted as lacking a well-defined truth-value relative to w.
12For a caveat, see The Construction of Logical Space, Section 8.2.3.
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‘mixed’ identity statements—i.e. identity statements relating terms of different sorts—
were best thought of as ill-formed, and I touted the fact that they could be treated
as ill-formed as a big advantage of compositionalism.13 As Gillian Russell points out,
however, there are cases in which it is natural to treat mixed identities as false rather
than meaningless (p. xx). Fortunately, the compositionalist would see no obstacle to
a specification of truth-conditions that yields this result. In fact, when the details are
spelled out in the right kind of way (footnote 11), ‘∀x∀n(x 6= n)’ will turn out to be true
whenever ‘x’ is a variable of the original sort and ‘n’ is a variable of the new sort.
This delivers a striking conclusion. It entails that the compositionalist can think of
herself as extending her domain of discourse whenever she extends her language in the
way just described. It is not, of course, that in extending her language she is making
the world grow: the world remains unchanged. The effect of extending her language is,
rather, that she acquires additional resources to describe the world. And since in this case
the additional resources deliver a theory of pure mathematics, what happens is that she
acquires additional resources for saying nothing (or, more precisely, additional resources
for forming sentences with trivially satisfiable truth-conditions). But the compositionalist
will think that it is nonetheless true that in so doing she expands her domain of discourse,
since she acquires terms that refer to objects to which she was previously unable to refer.
In the book I claimed that the compositionalist has no good reason to think that there
is a definite answer to the question of what objects exist, and therefore no good reason
to think that there is such a thing as quantification over ‘absolutely everything’ (§1.5).
As Eklund points out (p. xx), my arguments were inconclusive. It now seems to me,
however, that the compositionalist is in a position to say something stronger than what
I said in the book. For, as we just saw, she thinks that there is a procedure that would
allow one to start with an arbitrary language and acquire terms that refer to objects
outside the domain of that language.
13The Construction of Logical Space, Section 3.2.3
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Eklund is, in effect, describing a version of this procedure when he talks about ‘Turner
names’ (p. xx).14 Simplifying things a bit, the introduction of a Turner name is a special
case of the procedure described above: the special case in which one extends the language
so as to encompass not an interesting mathematical theory such as ordinary arithmetic,
but a boring mathematical theory such as modulo 1 arithmetic, where there is a single
‘number’ with no interesting properties to speak of.15 From a compositionalist’s point
of view, the introduction of modulo 1 arithmetic is no more problematic than the intro-
duction of ordinary arithmetic. To the extent that there is something awkward about
introducing such a theory, it is simply to do with the fact that it is so uncompromisingly
pointless.
If our discussion is along the right lines, compositionalism entails that an arbitrary
domain of discourse can be extended, and therefore that there can no such thing as
quantification over ‘absolutely everything’. Philosophers who take such quantification
seriously are therefore likely to regard compositionalism as suspect. Where, exactly,
would they want to get off the boat?
14Eklund borrows the idea from Turner ‘Ontological Pluralism’, , which builds on material from
Williamson, ‘Everything’.
15From a compositionalist perspective, the only significant difference between a Turner name and a
name for the modulo 1 ‘number’ is to do with the way in which newly introduced terms interact with
pre-existing vocabulary. Let P be an atomic predicate of the original language and let t be a newly
introduced term. In the case of arithmetic (modulo 1 or otherwise), it is natural to think that pP (t)q
should turn out to be false, or (as I prefer) ill-formed. In the case of the Turner name, on the other
hand, one stipulates, amongst other things, that pP (t)q is to count as true for any atomic predicate of
the original language.
It is tempting to see this as entailing that a Turner object would have all sorts of interesting properties,
if it existed. But that would be a mistake. What happens instead is that the additional stipulations
extend the meaning of the original predicates in unexpected ways, and that predications involving a
Turner name turn out to have unexpected truth-conditions. Suppose, for example, that the original
language includes the atomic predicates ‘Bachelor’ and ‘Married’, both of them standardly interpreted.
Then, if t is the Turner name, pBachelor(t) ∧Married(t)q will turn out to be true: indeed, it will turn
out to have trivially satisfiable truth-conditions. But that is not because a Turner object would be a
married bachelor. It is because we would have extended our language in a way that entails that ‘Bachelor’
and ‘Married’ have unexpected meanings. ‘Bachelor’, for example, comes to mean something like ‘is a
bachelor, if a member of the original domain; is self-identical otherwise’.
Eklund emphasizes that there is something jarring about the idea that a Turner name could be
genuinely referential. It seems to me that, as in the case of modulo 1 arithmetic, any awkwardness should
be traced back to the fact that the relevant extension of our language would be so uncompromisingly
pointless.
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My guess is that they would want to resist the idea that our language only makes
contact with the world at the level of sentences. They would insist—contrary to what I
suggested in Section 1.1—that the world must somehow be ‘responsive’ to a sentence’s
compositional structure in order to make the sentence true. In the book I made an effort
to spell out a version of this opposing view, and labelled the result ‘metaphysicalism’.
I did not, however, identify any contemporary examples of metaphysicalists. What I
did instead was suggest that philosophers who take ‘absolutely general’ quantification
seriously can be expected to embrace some form of metaphysicalism.
Eklund correctly emphasizes that the transition from absolute generality to meta-
physicalism is highly defeasible (p. xx). One can be a compositionalist without noticing
that there is a tension between compositionalism and absolute generality. And one can
reject compositionalism by adopting some view other than metaphysicalism.
Although these points are well taken, it is important not to lose track of the big
picture. What our discussion brings out is that it is hard to separate the metaphysical
question of absolute generality from questions about the relationship between our lan-
guage and the world it represents. So even if it is not always easy to know how to classify
the views of particular philosophers, it can be useful to know that their views about
metaphysical issues can carry serious commitments when it comes to the relationship
between our language and the world.
2 World
2.1 Metaphysical Structure (Eklund, Sider)
For a feature of reality to be metaphysically structured is for it to have a division into
constituent parts that is, in some sense, metaphysically distinguished: a division that is
rendered salient not by the way in which we happen to represent the relevant feature
of reality but, somehow, by the world itself. (As Eklund and Sider point out (p xx,
18
p. xx), one could also use ‘metaphysical structure’ in a difference sense, whereby a prop-
erty only counts as being carved out by the metaphysical structure of reality if it is an
‘elite’ or ‘perfectly natural’ property in Lewis’s sense.16 That is not how I understood
‘metaphysical structure’ in the book, and I now wish I had done more to advertise this.)
As I noted in Section 1.3, I have my doubts about whether there is such a thing as
metaphysical structure, and indeed, about whether the notion of metaphysical structure
makes good sense. But in the book I was officially neutral about such issues. I claimed,
in particular, that one could be a compositionalist even if one believed that the world
was metaphysically structured.
Eklund suggests that my claims of neutrality may be overblown. He argues that a
compositionalist who believed in metaphysical structure might end up with a combination
of views that ‘seems distinctly odd’:
(i) there are fine-grained facts, (ii) 0 exists, (iii) the property of being a
number exists, (iv) ‘0 is a number’ is true, but (v) yet there is no fine-grained
fact <0, number>. (p. xx)
It seems to me that this combination of views is not as bad as Eklund makes it out to
be, and would like to use the remainder of this section to explain why.
Consider a compositionalist who believes that ‘0 is a number’ has trivially satisfiable
truth-conditions: it will count as true regardless of how the world happens to be. What
feature of reality should such a sentence be said to describe? One option would say
that—like a truth of pure logic—it describes no particular feature of reality. But perhaps
our compositionalist thinks of facts in such a way that every true sentence must describe
some fact or other. (She will think that if, like me, she believes that for the fact that
p to obtain just is for it to be the case that p.) She will then wish to say that ‘0 is a
number’ describes a ‘trivial’ fact: a fact that would obtain regardless of how the world
turned out to be.
16Lewis, ‘New Work’.
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Now suppose that our compositionalist believes that reality is ‘metaphysically struc-
tured’. She believes, for example, that the fact that Socrates died has Socrates and the
property of dying as its metaphysically distinguished constituents, and therefore that
there is a nice correspondence between the syntactic structure of ‘Socrates died’ and the
metaphysical structure of the fact that this sentence describes. But our compositionalist
also thinks that this kind of correspondence won’t always obtain. She thinks, for exam-
ple, that the fact described by ‘Socrates’s death took place’ describes is the very same
fact as the fact described by ‘Socrates died’, and therefore that the grammatical structure
of ‘Socrates’s death took place’ does not correspond to the metaphysical structure of the
fact described.
What about ‘0 is a number’? Does our compositionalist think that its grammatical
structure corresponds to the metaphysical structure of the fact described? Our compo-
sitionalist may well think that the trivial fact—unlike the fact that Socrates died—has
no metaphysically distinguished constituents. If so, she will think that ‘0 is a number’ is
like ‘Socrates’s death took place’, in that they both have a grammatical structures that
fail to match the metaphysical structure of the facts they describe.
It is important to note, however, that none of this would stop our compositional-
ist from thinking that the number 0 exists. For, according to compositionalism, all it
takes for a term t to have a referent is for the truth-conditions of p∃x(x = t)q to be
satisfied—and they will certainly be satisfied in this case, since ‘∃x(x = 0)’ is a logical
consequence of ‘0 is a number’, which describes the trivial fact. So our compositionalist
does not think that ‘0’ can only refer to an object if that object is carved out by the
metaphysical structure of the fact described by ‘0 is a number’. (For similar reasons,
our compositionalist might be assumed to believe that the property of being a number
exists.)
Our imagined compositionalist will therefore believe all of the following:
(i) there is metaphysical structure, (ii) 0 exists, (iii) the property of being a
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number exists, (iv) ‘0 is a number’ is true, and (v) ‘0 is a number’ describes
the trivial fact, which does not have 0 and the property of being a number as
metaphysically distinguished components.
And, of course, if one understands a fine-grained fact as a fact that is metaphysically
structured, this is just a restatement of view that Eklund had described as ‘distinctly
odd’. Once it is seen in light of the discussion above, however, the view doesn’t strike
me as particularly problematic.
2.2 Why-Closure (Linnebo)
The question pWhy is it the case that φ?q can be understood in many different ways. A
straight reading of the question is one that can be paraphrased as follows:
I can see exactly what it takes to satisfy φ’s truth-conditions and I can see
that they are indeed satisfied, but I wish to better understand why the world
is such as to satisfy them.
A straight reading of ‘Why is there water on Mars?’, for example, might be answered
by supplying information about the way in which the Solar System was formed. But it
cannot be answered by saying ‘because there is H2O on Mars’. For this second answer
would only be appropriate in a context in which one’s interlocutor doesn’t realize that
water is H2O, and therefore doesn’t fully understand what it takes for the truth conditions
of ‘there is water on Mars’ to be satisfied.
One of the key ideas of the book is what might be called the Thesis of Why-Closure—
the claim that if φ is a first-order sentence that follows from the set of true ‘just is’-
statements, then φ is why-closed : there is no sense to be made of a straight reading of
pWhy is it the case that φ?q.
To illustrate the Thesis of Why-Closure, let us suppose that ‘to be composed of water
just is to be composed of H2O’ is a true ‘just is’-statement. Then the conditional ‘if
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something is composed of water, it is composed of H2O’ is a consequence of the set of
true ‘just is’-statements. So the Thesis of Why-Closure tells us that the conditional
should count as why-closed: there should be no sense to be made of a straight reading
of the question ‘why are things that are composed of water composed of H2O?’. And,
indeed, it is natural to reject such a question by saying something along the lines of
‘What do you mean why? To be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O!’.
If Mathematical Trivialism is correct, then every truth of pure mathematics turns out
to be a consequence of the set of true ‘just is’-statements.17 So the Thesis of Why-Closure
entails that every truth of pure mathematics should be why-closed. There should, for
instance, be no sense to be made of a straight reading of the question ‘Why is it the case
that 2+2=4?’.
Linnebo points out that ‘the following sequence of equations seems to provide a good
explanation of why 2 + 2 = 4 in terms of the recursion equations governing addition:
2 + 2 = 2 + 1′ = (2 + 1)′ = (2 + 0′)′ = (2 + 0)′ = 2′ = 3′ = 4.’ (p. xx) The trivialist is
committed to denying is that this is a good answer to the straight reading of ‘Why is it
the case that 2+2=4?’. For if nothing is required of the world for the truth-condition of
‘2 + 2 = 4’ to be satisfied, there can be no good answer to the question of why the world
is such as to satisfy this condition. But the trivialist can grant that Linnebo’s suggested
explanation is a good way of answering a non-straight reading of the question. There
is, for example, a non-straight reading of the question that lends itself to the following
paraphrase:
Help me see how the basic rules governing addition come together to secure
the truth of ‘2 + 2 = 4’.
The trivialist could certainly see Linnebo’s explanation as a good way of addressing such
a demand. As a result of all this, I am very much in agreement with Linnebo’s observation
17The Construction of Logical Space, Section 2.2
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that a mathematical sentence can count as why-closed, and still admit of explanation in
some sense of ‘explanation’. Linnebo anticipates this sort of reaction, and suggests that
it won’t take us very far: all one gets is the conclusion that ‘the explanatory burden
that [Linnebo believes] should be classified as metaphysical will instead be classified as
semantic. The explanatory burden itself will remain unchanged.’ (p. xx)
In a sense, I agree: a mathematical trivialist is under no less pressure to understand
why mathematical statements are true than her rivals. At the same time, it seems to me
that it can make a difference to think of mathematical explanations as ‘semantic’ rather
than ‘metaphysical’. To see this, suppose that one is a trivialist. When asked to explain
why there are infinitely many primes, one interprets the request ‘semantically’. One sees
the request as amounting to something along the following lines:
Derive ‘there are infinitely many primes’ from principles that a mathematician
would regard as basic by using a proof that with such-and-such features.
or perhaps
Derive ‘there are infinitely many primes’ from principles I have a good handle
on by using a proof that I am able to get my head around.
On either of these ways of cashing out the explanatory request, it is clear enough what
one is being asked to do. So, as understood by the trivialist, there is a satisfactory way
of modeling the practice of asking for and giving mathematical explanations.
Now suppose one is not a trivialist. One thinks that the truth of ‘there are infinitely
many primes’ imposes a non-trivial requirement on the world. So one might wonder
why such a requirement is met. In other words: one might demand an answer to the
straight reading of ‘Why are there infinitely many primes?’. And the problem with such a
question is that it is genuinely unclear whether there is a sensible answer to be given. To
see this, notice that the question—on its straight reading—could be recast as something
along the following lines:
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Since I am a non-trivialist, I concede that when God created the Sun’s eight
planets—and when she made sure that there were only eight of them—there
was more to be done. She would have to do something extra to ensure that the
number of planets was eight. Similarly, it was not automatic that there would
be infinitely many primes, as the trivialist believes. I want to understand why
this extra fact came about. I want to understand why we don’t live in a world
in which there are planets, but no number of the planets—and no infinitely
many primes.
What would a sensible answer to such a question look like? A causal explanation doesn’t
seem to hold much promise. And, to my mind at least, it is unclear what a sensible non-
causal explanation could look like. An advantage of adopting trivialism is that one is in
a position reject the need to answer such questions, on the grounds that they are based
on false presuppositions. So although Linnebo is right to point out that the trivialist
exchanges the burden of a ‘metaphysical’ explanation for the burden of a ‘semantic’
explanation, it seems to me that the exchange is well worth the trouble. (I do not mean
to suggest, however, that there is no room to maneuver.18)
2.3 Explanation (Linnebo)
Some philosophers might take the following to be true:
[Table Explanation]
There is a table because there are some things arranged table-wise.
Linnebo argues (p. xx) that [Table Explanation] is in tension with the Thesis of Why-
Closure (described in the preceding section), if one also accepts:
[Tables]
For there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged table-wise.
18Linnebo, ‘Reference by abstraction’.
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I agree with Linnebo that there is a tension here. But I don’t think the Thesis of Why-
Closure is needed to generate it. It seems to me that [Table Explanation] is in tension
with [Tables], regardless of one’s views about the Thesis of Why-Closure.
The reason is simple. [Table Explanation], as Linnebo understands it, is an explana-
tory claim. It states that the fact that there is a table is explained by the fact that
there are some things arranged table-wise. But whether or not one accepts the Thesis of
Why-Closure, one should take [Tables] to entail that ‘there is a table’ and ‘there are some
things arranged table-wise’ are descriptions of the very same feature of reality. So—on
the plausible assumption that nothing can explain itself—it follows from [Tables] that
[Table Explanation] cannot be correct.
Since I am inclined to think that [Tables] is true, Linnebo is right to suggest that I
am committed to rejecting [Table Explanation]. Linnebo goes on to suggest, however,
that such a rejection is something I am ‘deeply committed to’ (p. xx), and with this I
disagree.
I am deeply committed to the idea that our conception of what needs explaining and
what doesn’t is determined by the system of ‘just is’-statements we accept. I am also
deeply committed to a particular methodology for deciding which ‘just is’-statements to
accept. But I am not deeply committed to any particular choice of ‘just is’-statements.
It is true that there are ‘just is’-statements—like [Numbers], from Section 1.2—that I
take to be strongly supported by the methodological considerations I articulate in the
book. It is also true that there are particular ‘just is’-statements I find attractive, and
that [Tables] happens to be one of them. But the aim of the book is emphatically not to
defend ‘just is’-statements like [Tables]. Quite the contrary: my hope is that the basic
theoretical framework of the book—and, in particular, my claims about the relationship
between ‘just is’-statements and why-closure—might be used to accommodate a broad
range of philosophical outlooks, with differences between these outlooks modeled, in part,
as differences in the ‘just is’-statements that their proponents would choose to adopt. In
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particular, my hope is that the basic theoretical framework of the book might be used
to accommodate a friend of [Table Explanation], and that it might be used to model the
disagreement between us: since the friend of [Table Explanation] will be forced to reject
[Tables], our disagreement can be modeled, in part, as a disagreement about which ‘just
is’-statements to adopt.
It seems to me, moreover, that the methodology I set forth in the book for deciding
which ‘just is’-statements to adopt can be used to move the debate forward. For I think
the methodology can be used to argue that rejecting [Tables] comes at a cost. One is
left with a theoretical gap between the existence of tables and the existence of things
arranged table-wise, a gap that leaves room for lines of inquiry such as the following:
I can see that there some particles arranged table-wise, and I can see that
if it was also the case that there was a table, the table’s existence would
be explained by the existence of the particles arranged table-wise. But why
should I believe that there is actually a table?
A friend of [Table Explanation] might think that such questions turn out to have interest-
ing answers: answers that would lead to fruitful lines of inquiry. I am skeptical that this
is so. But my skepticism is not a ‘deep’ commitment. Show me an interesting enough
theory of the connection between tables and particles arranged table-wise, and I might
lean the other way.
2.4 Grounding (Cameron)
As I understand it in the book, the ‘just is’-operator is a no-difference operator: I take
‘for it to be the case that p just is for it to be the case that q’ to be equivalent to ‘there
is no difference between its being the case that p and its being the case that q’. This
means, in particular, that I take the ‘just is’-operator to be symmetric: if ‘≡’ is the ‘just
is’-operator, then ‘p ≡ q’ and ‘q ≡ p’ will always be equivalent.
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There are philosophers who work with a notion of grounding that is taken to be
asymmetric: if the fact that p is grounded in the fact that q, then it is not the case that
the fact that q is grounded in the fact that p. Ross Cameron asks an interesting question:
‘Suppose we come to the table thinking of things in terms of grounding. Are we able to
use the resources we are happy with to understand Rayo’s symmetric just is statements?’
(p. xx) He then suggests the following answer: ‘the prospects for defining a symmetric
notion in terms of grounding that will also let us assent to the kind of just is claims that
Rayo assents to are dim’ (p. xx)
It seems to me that it is important to distinguish between two different issues. The
first is the question whether one can define the ‘just is’-operator using vocabulary that
the friend of grounding is already committed to. The second is the question whether a
friend of grounding would have to disagree with me about which ‘just is’-statements to
accept.
I would regard a negative answer to the first question as (mildly) disappointing news.
For if the ‘just is’-operator turns out to be definable on the basis of grounding-friendly
notions, proponents of grounding would have an easy way of coming to understand the
‘just is’-operator. If it isn’t, then proponents of grounding will be in the same boat of
the rest of us: they will have no choice but to understand the notion on the basis of its
theoretical role.
In contrast, I would not regard a negative answer to the second question as disap-
pointing news. For, as I emphasized in the preceding section, my hope is that the basic
theoretical framework of the book might be used to accommodate a broad range of philo-
sophical outlooks, with differences between them modeled, in part, as differences in the
‘just is’-statements their proponents choose to adopt.
To see how this might come about in the case at hand, consider the following ground-
ing claim:
[Table Grounding]
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The fact that there is a table is grounded in the fact that there are some
things arranged table-wise.
On the assumption that no fact can ground itself, [Table Grounding] entails that the
fact that there is a table is distinct from the fact that there are some things arranged
table-wise. It therefore entails that the following ‘just is’-statement is false:
[Tables]
For there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged table-wise.
So someone who accepts [Table Grounding] would disagree with me about whether to
accept [Tables], and will do so regardless of whether she thinks that the ‘just is’-operator
is definable on the basis of grounding-friendly notions. It seems to me, however, that
such a result is good news rather than bad, since it gives us a useful way of characterizing
my disagreement with the proponent of grounding.
There is a different way of thinking about grounding where we don’t get a conflict
with [Tables]. Suppose that instead of accepting [Table Grounding] one were to accept
the following:
[Table Fundamentality]
What it is, fundamentally speaking, for there to be a table is for there to be
some things arranged table-wise.
Suppose, moreover, that [Table Fundamentality] is to be understood as the conjunction
of two theses: (a) ‘there is a table’ and ‘there are things arranged table-wise’ describe the
same fact, and (b) at the fundamental level, the relevant fact concerns things arranged
table-wise rather than tables.
On this way of seeing things, [Table Fundamentality] is not in conflict with [Tables]: it
entails [Tables], because of claim (a). So the friend of [Table Fundamentality] agrees with
me about [Tables], even though we disagree about claim (b). Correspondingly, the friend
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of [Table Fundamentality] disagrees with the friend of [Table Grounding] about [Tables],
even though they are both grounders. The lesson of all this is that a ‘just is’-statement
like [Tables] can give us a nice way of modeling certain agreements and disagreements in
the debate about grounding. More generally, it seems to me that the basic theoretical
framework of the book should be available to friends and foes of grounding alike, and
that differences between different sorts of views can sometimes be modeled as differences
in the ‘just is’-statements one chooses to adopt.
I would now like to return to the first component of Cameron’s line of questioning: the
problem of whether is it possible to define the ‘just is’-operator on the basis of vocabulary
that the friend of grounding is committed to already.
Some proponents of grounding are committed to fact-talk. For them the task of
defining the ‘just is’-operator should be totally straightforward:
pp ≡ qq =df pthe fact that p¯ = the fact that q¯q
where r¯ = r if r is true, and r¯ = p¬rq if r is false. Of course, a proponent of grounding
might wish to resist fact-talk—or she might be happy to indulge in fact-talk but deny
that pthe fact that pq picks out a fact for every true sentence p.
An alternative strategy is based on the observation that if the proponent of grounding
is committed to a notion of truth-conditions, she could take pp ≡ qq to be true just in case
p and q have the same truth-conditions. As Cameron points out, Sider’s brand of ground-
ing presupposes a notion of truth-conditions that might be used for such a purpose.19
One could claim, in particular, that pp ≡ qq is true just in case Sider’s ‘metaphysical
semantics’ entails p‘p’ is true ↔ ‘q’ is trueq.
Cameron worries, however, that such a definition would lead to unwelcome results,
on the grounds that different ‘tautologies get different truth-conditions in [Sider’s] meta-
physical semantics; and yet it seems like if there are any two claims such that there is ‘no
19Sider, Writing the Book of the World.
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difference’ between the demands they make on the world, two tautologies should meet
that criterion.’ (p. xx)
I agree that it would be odd to suggest that different tautologies place different
demands on the world, but I don’t think the oddness should cast doubt on the idea that
the notion of truth-conditions can be used to characterize the ‘just is’-operator. If one
thinks that tautologies >1 and >2 have have different truth-conditions, then one should
certainly reject p>1 ≡ >2q. In doing so one would commit oneself to a particularly fine-
grained conception of logical space.20 It is not the conception of logical space that I myself
would favor, but I think it can be accommodated by the basic theoretical framework of
the book.
2.5 Alstonian Symmetry (Cameron)
Let ‘brain state B’ be shorthand for a description of a certain brain state in physical
terms, and consider the following ‘just is’-statement:
[Red]
To experience the sensation of seeing red just is to be in brain state B.
Someone who accepts [Red] thinks that the following line of questioning is based on a
mistake:
I can see that the subject is in brain state B. But I would like to know how
one could ever be justified in believing that a certain further fact obtains:
the fact that the subject is experiencing the sensation of seeing red. And if it
20Depending on how the details are spelled out, one might also end up with the conclusion that
tautologies fail to have have trivially truth-conditions. So, as Cameron points out, one won’t be able to
say that φ has trivially satisfiable truth-conditions just in case pφ↔ >q is true, for > a tautology. From
my point of view, this would, again, be an odd result. But, again, I don’t think the oddness should cast
doubt on the idea that the notion of truth-conditions can be used to characterize the ‘just is’-operator.
It is simply a consequence of the view that tautologies fail to have trivially satisfiable truth-conditions.
(For further discussion, see Section 1.3.)
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turns out that this further fact does indeed obtain, I would like to understand
why it obtains. Why isn’t it instead the case that the subject is a zombie?
If [Red] is true, there is no such thing as the supposed further fact: for the subject to be
in brain state B is already for her to experience the sensation of seeing red. In contrast,
someone who rejects [Red] is committed to thinking that there is no mistake, and that
the ensuing explanatory and justificatory demands need to be addressed. How might she
go about addressing them? One option would be to postulate ‘qualia’—intrinsic, non-
representational, properties of sensory experiences—and claim that they are not reducible
to physical properties. She could then go on to suggest that what it takes for a subject
in brain state B to also experience the sensation of seeing red is for her to bear the right
kind of conscious access to a non-physical ‘redness quale’. Finally, she could claim that
the reason our subject is not a zombie is that she is lucky enough to bear this relationship
to a suitable qualia.
The lesson of all this, I suggest, is that an advantage of accepting [Red] is that it
relieves one from the need to countenance non-physical qualia. Drawing inspiration from
a famous argument due to William Alston,21 Cameron thinks that such a conclusion
cannot go through without additional argumentation: ‘If I start out worried that when
I say ‘I am experiencing redness’ [. . . ] I am committing myself to an immaterial redness
quale, how is my worry eased by coming to learn that to experience redness just is to be
in a certain brain state? Why shouldn’t I just be worried now that believing in brain
states is to commit to immaterial qualia?’
I agree with Cameron that a supplementary argument is needed, but I disagree with
him about the shape that the argument should take. My own view is best introduced
with an example. Suppose that one starts out believing that to experience the sensation
of seeing red is to bear the right kind of relationship to a non-physical ‘redness quale’.
Accordingly, one believes that whether or not someone is a zombie—and, in particular,
21Alston, ‘Ontological Commitments’.
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whether or not she is experiencing the sensation of seeing red—is not the sort of issue
that could be settled by giving a full description of her brain in purely physical terms. At
the same time, one thinks that whether or not the subject is in brain state B is the sort
of issue that could be settled by giving a full description of her brain in purely physical
terms.
At a later time, one comes to accept [Red]: one comes to believe that there is no
difference between being in brain state B and experiencing the sensation of being red.
As a result, one can no longer believe both that one can settle whether the subject is in
brain state B by giving a full description of her brain in physical terms and that one
cannot settle whether the subject experiencing the sensation of seeing red by giving a
full description of her brain in physical terms. One of these claims must be given up,
and Cameron’s questions will be answered in different ways depending on which of the
two one chooses to reject.
Suppose, first, that in accepting [Red] one abandons the view that one cannot settle
whether the subject is experiencing the sensation of seeing red by giving a full description
of her brain in physical terms. Then one must either give up on qualia altogether, or
come to think that qualia are ultimately reducible to the physical. Either way, the result
of accepting [Red] is that one will be left with no reason to worry about non-physical
qualia.
Now suppose that one instead decides to retain the view that to experience the sensa-
tion of seeing red is to bear the right kind of relationship to a non-physical ‘redness quale’.
Accordingly, one accepts [Red] by abandoning the view that one can settle whether the
subject is in brain state B by giving a full description of her brain in physical terms.
Then the result of accepting [Red] is that one should worry that brain state B requires
the existence of non-physical qualia.
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3 Language
3.1 Semantics (Hofweber)
Hofweber suggests that ‘one would expect considerations about the semantics of English
to be relevant for this question [of which ‘just is’-statements to adopt]’. (p. xx) I do
claim, after all, that for the ‘just is’-statement pp ≡ qq to be true is for p and q to have
the same truth-conditions. But, as Hofweber goes on to observe, there is virtually no
mention of natural language semantics in the book. Isn’t this an important omission?
It seems to me that it is not. To see what I have in mind, consider the following ‘just
is’-statement:
[Water]
For the glass to be filled with water just is for the glass to be filled with H2O.
A natural language semantics should certainly not be expected to settle the question
of whether [Water] is true—at least not on its own. For even if one expects a natural
language semantics to deliver an assignment of meanings to words like ‘water’ and ‘H2O’,
in some sense of ‘meaning’, one shouldn’t expect it to settle the question of whether
‘water’ and ‘H2O’ express the same property, since that would require taking a stand on
the chemical hypothesis that water is H2O, and natural language semantics shouldn’t be
in the business of making chemical hypotheses.
I am not claiming that linguistic theorizing would be entirely useless to the project
of determining whether [Water] is true. The point is just that I don’t think that’s where
the action is. If one really wants to know whether to accept [Water], one should turn to
chemistry rather than linguistics.
One might be tempted to resist this thought by claiming that there is a certain
kind of division of labor. For even if one concedes that it is not the job of natural
language semantics to identify the property expressed by ‘water’, one might think that
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it is the job of natural language semantics to identify a function that would output
such a property given suitable information about the way the world is. Perhaps one
thinks that the semantics would assign a primary intension to ‘water’.22 One could then
claim that when applied to the actual world, the primary intention of ‘water’ delivers
the property of being composed of H2O, and when applied to a world in which the lakes
and rivers are filled with XYZ, the primary intention of ‘water’ delivers the property of
being composed of XYZ. This would allow one to see the task of ascertaining whether
[Water] is true as divided into two distinct parts. First, one uses a natural language
semantics to associate suitable primary intensions with ‘water’ and ‘H2O’. Second, one
inputs information about the chemical world into these primary intensions and gets the
properties expressed by ‘water’ and ‘H2O’. One can then determine whether [Water] is
true by ascertaining whether these properties are one and the same.
I myself am skeptical of the hypothesis that a word like ‘water’ has a well-defined
primary intension.23 But even if it does, it should be agreed on all sides that nobody
knows how to identify it in practice. And it is worth emphasizing that contemporary
linguistics isn’t much help here. For linguistic theory—and even the branch of linguistic
theory that is usually referred to as ‘semantics’—has much more to say about grammar
than about lexical meaning. As far as I know, there is no work in contemporary linguistics
aimed at identifying anything like the primary intentions of our words.
If one wants to determine whether [Water] is true, the only sensible course of action I
can think of is to set linguistics aside, and use one’s basic linguistic competence, together
with one’s knowledge of chemical phenomena, to form hypotheses about the property
that might be expressed by ‘water’. Different hypotheses will lead to more or less fruitful
theorizing and do so while adhering more or less faithfully to ordinary linguistic usage.
So one should select a hypothesis that leads to fruitful theorizing without diverging too
22Chalmers, The Conscious Mind ; Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics.
23See Block and Stalnaker ‘Conceptual Analysis’.
34
drastically from ordinary usage, and assess the truth of [Water] with respect to such
a hypothesis. (In the special case of [Water], there is a unique hypothesis that stands
out in light of our best chemical theorizing—the hypothesis that ‘water’ expresses the
property of being composed of H2O—but in other cases one’s selection may require a
certain degree of arbitrariness.24)
Our discussion has so far been focused on the particular example of [Water]. But what
about ‘just is’-statements of other kinds? I think Hofweber is right to think that there
may be cases in which natural language semantics might help us ascertain whether a
given ‘just is’-statement is true. In other work,25 he has argued that ‘There are (exactly)
four moons of Jupiter’ and ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ are linguistically
equivalent in a way that guarantees that they must have the same truth-conditions. If this
is right, we will have purely linguistic grounds for accepting [Numbers] from Section 1.2.
Having an additional argument for [Numbers] would certainly constitute welcome news.
But I still think that one shouldn’t put too much weight on linguistic considerations in
arguing for [Numbers]. For although there is much to be said about Hofweber’s linguistic
arguments, they are ultimately controversial,26 and one wouldn’t want one’s philosophy
of mathematics held hostage to the outcome of a debate in linguistics.
3.2 Objective Correctness (Hofweber, Russell)
In the book I consider a natural way of thinking about the notion of truth (§2.3). To
set forth a statement is to make a distinction amongst ways for the world to be, and
to single out one side of that distinction; for the statement to be true is for the region
singled out to include the way the world actually is. (To set forth the statement that
snow is white, for example, is to distinguish between white-snow and non-white-snow
ways for the world to be, and to suggest that the world falls on the white-snow side of
24For further discussion, see The Construction of Logical Space, Section 2.1.
25Hofweber, ‘Innocent Statements’.
26Jackson, ‘Defusing Easy Arguments’; Moltmann, ‘Reference to Numbers’.
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this distinction; for the statement to be true is for the way the world actually is to fall on
the white-snow side of the distinction—for it to actually be the case that snow is white.)
Natural as it is, this way of thinking about truth has a surprising consequence. The
best way to see the point is to consider the matter from the perspective of someone who
thinks that to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O. Our subject believes,
in other words, that the distinction between water-containing ways for the world to be,
and the rest, is just the distinction between H2O-containing ways for the world to be,
and the rest.
Suppose that our subject sets out to assess the following sentence for truth or falsity:
[No H2O]
There is water in the world, but no H2O.
On the conception of truth that is under discussion, she would have to start by distin-
guishing between ways for the world to be whereby there is water but no H2O, and the
rest, and then consider the question of which side of this distinction includes the way the
world actually is. But our subject is committed to thinking that the relevant distinction
is trivial, since she is committed to thinking that there is no difference between ways
for the world to be whereby there is water and ways for the world to be whereby there
is H2O. This means that, from her perspective, it is impossible for the way the world
actually is to supply an independent check on the question of whether [No H2O] true.
As soon our subject has laid down her conception of logical space—as soon as she has
decided upon a set of distinctions with which to discriminate between ways for the world
to be—the issue has been settled. There is no need to look at the way the world actually
is.
Not so when it comes to the statement that snow is white. In this case, even after our
subject has laid down her conception of logical space—even after she has decided upon
a set of distinctions with which to discriminate between ways for the world to be—there
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is still room for the way the world actually is to supply an independent check on the
question of whether the statement is true. For even if her conception of logical space
shapes the way in which she sees statements as distinguishing between ways for the world
to be, it does not settle the question of whether the way the world actually is falls on
one side or the other of the distinction between white-snow and non-white-snow ways for
the world to be.
Now consider the question of whether our subject’s ‘just is’-statement—‘to be com-
posed of water just is to be composed of H2O’—is objectively correct. What could one
mean by ‘objective correctness’ here? If all one means is truth—and if one is thinking
of truth in the way I suggested above—then it’s not clear how questions of objective
correctness could be settled by the way the world is. For although one could certainly
point out that the subject’s ‘just is’-statement is true relative to her own conception of
logical space, that simply leads to the question of whether her conception of logical space
constitutes an ‘objectively correct’ framework with which to assess the truth of a given
‘just is’-statement. And it is not clear that this is something that can be settled by the
way the world is. For it is not clear that in adopting a conception of logical space one
commits to one amongst different ways for the world to be, rather than simply adopting
a family of distinctions with which to discriminate between ways for the world to be.
We seem to be trapped in a circle. We want the way the world is to settle the question
of which conception of logical space is objectively correct, but the way the world is can
only make such determinations against the background of a distinction between ways for
the world to be, and therefore against the background of a conception of logical space.
Once we adopt a conception of logical space, however, the issue of which conception of
logical space is correct gets settled independently of the way the world is. For none of the
distinctions one adopts in adopting a conception of logical space will distinguish between
that conception of logical space and one of its rivals. So one’s conception of logical space
will be vindicated regardless of where in one’s system of distinctions the way the world
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actually happens to be located.
Hofweber objects that ‘none of this shows that there is no objectively correct logical
space, or no objectively true ‘just is’-statements.’ (p. xx) I think he is right. The most
my argument shows is that—on a certain way of thinking about truth—it is hard to
see how the way the world is could have any impact on the truth or falsity of a ‘just
is’-statement (and therefore on the objective correctness of a conception of logical space).
But this does not entail there is no such thing as objective truth for ‘just is’-statements.
All it shows that one cannot do much to elucidate such a notion, while using a particular
set of theoretical tools.
It is partly because my arguments were inconclusive that I tried to remain neutral
about these issues in the book. I did, however, report a suspicion that there is no such
thing as a notion of objective truth or falsity for ‘just is’-statements: all one can say is
that a given subject should accept or reject particular ‘just is’ statements depending on
whether they lead to fruitful theorizing, and that relative to the set of ‘just is’ statements
one accepts the statements in that set will count as true.27
Hofweber uses ‘Carnapian Rayo’ as label for someone who accepts this position, and
argues that Carnapian Rayo must be mistaken. For consider the following ‘just is’-
statement:
[Tenor]
To be Thomas Hofweber just is to be the greatest tenor ever.
Hofweber asks: ‘is acceptance and rejection of [Tenor] partly a practical question, the
result of cost-benefit analysis on how to conceive of logical space? And is its truth
determined by these considerations?’ He thinks the answer is clear: ‘I see little hope for
Carnapian Rayo here. [Tenor] is simply false, and no cost-benefit analysis will make any
[difference] to that.’ (p. xx)
27The Construction of Logical Space, Section 2.3.
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How should Carnapian Rayo respond? Recall that what is distinctive about Car-
napian Rayo’s view is that he thinks that there is no sense to be made of an ‘objective’
notion of truth for ‘just is’-statements: all one can say is that a particular subject should
accept or reject particular ‘just is’ statements depending on whether they lead to fruitful
theorizing, and that relative to the set of ‘just is’ statements one accepts the statements
in that set will count as true (and the rest will count as false). So the way Carnapian
Rayo will want to respond to Hofweber’s challenge is not by conceding that [Tenor] is
objectively false—Carnapian Rayo believes that there is no such thing—but by arguing
that one should reject [Tenor] regardless of one’s theoretical goals.
Let us therefore consider the question how to determine whether to accept or reject
a given ‘just is’-statement, according to Carnapian Rayo. In the preceding section I
suggested that the way to determine whether to accept [Water] is to use one’s linguistic
competence, together with one’s knowledge of chemical phenomena, to form hypotheses
about the property expressed by ‘water’, and then select a hypothesis that leads to fruitful
theorizing without diverging too drastically from ordinary linguistic usage. Similarly, I
think Carnapian Rayo should say that the way to ascertain whether [Tenor] is true is
to use one’s linguistic competence, together with one’s knowledge of relevant worldly
phenomena, to form hypotheses about the object picked out by ‘Thomas Hofweber’ and
the property expressed by ‘greatest tenor’, and then select a hypothesis that leads to
fruitful theorizing without diverging too drastically from ordinary linguistic usage.
There may well turn out to be more than one hypothesis that deserves to be taken seri-
ously. Suppose that on one hypothesis ‘Thomas Hofweber’ refers to the present Hofweber
time-slice, and that, on another hypothesis, it refers to the mereological fusion of Hofwe-
ber time-slices. If one of these hypotheses leads to more fruitful theorizing than the other,
then there might be a case for accepting it, even if it diverges from ordinary usage to
some extent. Taking ‘Thomas Hofweber’ to refer to anything in the vicinity of Pla´cido
Domingo, on the other hand, would constitute too much of a divergence from ordinary
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usage, no matter how theoretically useful. Similarly, taking ‘greatest tenor’ to express
anything unrelated to quality singing in the high male register would constitute too
much a divergence from ordinary usage, no matter how theoretically useful. So, unless
Hofweber has been keeping quiet about his singing abilities, there is no way of getting
the material biconditional corresponding to [Tenor] to turn out to be true without doing
unacceptable violence to ordinary linguistic usage, regardless of one’s theoretical goals.
(Getting [Tenor] itself to turn out to be true would be harder still, since ordinary usage
suggests that ‘Thomas Hofweber’ ought to be treated as a rigid designator, unlike ‘the
greatest tenor ever’.)
Notice, incidentally, that this way of thinking does not presuppose that different hy-
potheses about the referent of ‘Thomas Hofweber’ or the property expressed by ‘greatest
tenor’ must correspond to different assignments of meanings to our terms, in a pre-
theoretic sense of ‘meaning’. That is an issue that will depend on how robust our pre-
theoretic notion of meaning turns out to be. If one assumes that the meanings of our
words are definite enough to output unique assignments of reference given sufficient in-
formation about the way the world is, then at most one referential hypothesis for a given
term can respect its meaning. But, to my mind at least, it seems implausible to suppose
that one could identify a notion of meaning as robust as that: linguistic usage is just too
messy and parochial.
As a contrast case, consider the expression ‘members of the same species’. On one
hypothesis, ‘members of the same species’ expresses the property of sharing a lineage of
the right kind; on another, it expresses the property of being members of a group capable
of generating fertile offspring. On the assumption that neither of these hypotheses does
unacceptable violence to ordinary usage, one might turn to considerations of theoretical
fruitfulness in deciding which of these hypotheses to accept. And since judgments of
theoretical fruitfulness depend, in part, on one’s theoretical goals, it may well turn out
that people with different theoretical goals favor different hypotheses. Accordingly, the
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decision to accept a ‘just is’-statement like
[Species]
To be members of the same species just is to share a lineage of the right kind.
may ultimately depend on one’s theoretical goals.
The lesson of our discussion is that even if there are cases like [Species] in which
Carnapian Rayo thinks that the decision to accept a ‘just is’-statement should be sensitive
pragmatic considerations, there are also cases like [Tenor] in which he thinks that one
should accept (or reject) the relevant ‘just is’-statement regardless of one’s theoretical
goals. It is for that reason that Carnapian Rayo can do justice to Hofweber’s intuition
that ‘[Tenor] is simply false, and no cost-benefit analysis will make any [difference] to
that’.
Russell agrees with Hofweber that Carnapian Rayo’s views have unpalatable conse-
quences. She brings out the problem by considering a puzzle of personal identity over
time. Suppose ‘your brain will be gradually repaired and ultimately replaced with me-
chanical and computer parts, serving the same functions as the parts they replace. Call
the resultant person, with the computer parts in her or his head, ‘A’. Meanwhile your
original brain parts will be preserved, reconstructed, and plumbed and wired into the
head of a new body. Call the resulting person, with your old brain parts, ‘B’. Now you
learn that person B is to be tortured, whereas A will not’ (p. xx).
Russell asks us to consider the question of whether the following ‘just is’-statement
is true:
[Torture]
For person B to be tortured just is for you to be tortured.
She then argues that such a statement must be either objectively true or objectively false:
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it just seems wrong to say that there is no objective fact of the matter [about
whether [Torture] is true], or that whether or not it is true depends on which
System of Representation, or Linguistic Framework, or Conception of Logical
Space one chooses to accept. If only changing your Conception of Logical
Space could prevent you from being tortured! (p. xx)
Here it is worth remembering Honest Abe: ‘How many legs does a dog have if you call
the tail a leg? Four. Calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg.’ Even if one agrees with
Carnapian Rayo that the decision to accept a ‘just is’-statement like [Species] should
be sensitive to pragmatic considerations, one shouldn’t think that one could change
any biological facts by changing one’s conception of logical space. In changing one’s
conception of logical space one changes the set of distinctions one uses to represent
biological facts, but the facts themselves remain unchanged. All Carnapian Rayo is
committed to is the claim that changing one’s theoretical goals—for example, turning
one’s attention from biological lineage to the ability of groups to interbreed—can lead to
a change in the property one should take ‘members of the same species’ to express. And
this strikes me as just the right thing to say in the case at hand: researchers immersed in
different lines of inquiry might find it useful to take different properties to be expressed
by ‘members of the same species’. There is no obvious reason to stop them, unless our
best biological theorizing turns out to give one of these properties an especially important
role.
Similarly, it seems to me that when it comes to [Torture], the key issue is not whether
one could keep oneself from being tortured by changing one’s theoretical goals: Carnapian
Rayo would agree that one can’t. The key issue is whether a change in one’s theoretical
goals could lead to a change in the set of distinctions that one should us to theorize
about the world—and, in particular, a change in the objects one should take ‘person B’
and ‘you’ (as used in a particular context) to refer to.
I do not deny that Russell’s [Torture] poses a challenge for Carnapian Rayo. But I
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think the challenge is similar to the challenge posed by Hofweber’s [Tenor]. In both cases,
we have the intuition that the truth-value of the relevant ‘just is’-statement should be
independent of one’s theoretical goals, and in both cases the challenge is to explain how
Carnapian Rayo could do justice to this intuition. I argued earlier that Carnapian Rayo
is in a position to do justice to the intuition in the case of [Tenor], and I see no reason
to think that he couldn’t use a similar strategy do justice to the intuition in the case of
[Torture].
Carnapian Rayo will take the status of [Torture] to depend on what our best theory
of personal identity turns out to be. Suppose, for example, that philosophers were to
coalesce around the view that there are immortal souls, and that whether or not you are
identical to Russell’s person B depends entirely on whether your soul will be transferred
onto B’s body after the relevant procedure. Then Carnapian Rayo would say that one
should accept [Torture] if and only if the relevant soul-transfer takes place, and he would
add that one should do so independently of one’s theoretical goals. So, in accordance
with the initial intuition, he will claim that the decision to accept [Torture] should not
be sensitive to pragmatic considerations.
More generally, if philosophers were to come up with a good way of settling the
question of whether you are person B, then Carnapian Rayo would follow suit by using
those very considerations to argue that [Torture] ought to be accepted, regardless of
one’s theoretical aims. And if philosophers were unable find a good way of settling the
question of whether you are person B, then Carnapian Rayo would follow suit by claiming
that, even when conjoined with our best philosophical theorizing about personal identity,
the facts about ordinary linguistic usage are not enough to settle the question of what
‘person B’ and ‘you’ (as used in a given context) should be taken to refer to. Accordingly
he would claim that the question of whether or not one ought to accept [Torture] is
something that cannot be decided independently of the purposes at hand.
In this latter scenario, Carnapian Rayo will have failed to respect the initial intuition
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that the truth value of [Torture] should be independent of one’s theoretical goals. But it
is important to be clear that this has nothing to do with his controversial views about the
objective truth for ‘just is’-statements. His conclusions so far are simply a consequence
of the assumption that philosophers are unable to make progress on questions of personal
identity, together with a plausible-sounding story about how to decide amongst different
hypotheses about the referents of our terms.
Notice, moreover, that Carnapian Rayo has made no claims about the feature of reality
that Russell’s transplant story describes. In particular, he has not claimed that there’s
no fact of the matter about the way the world is when the torturing takes place. What
Carnapian Rayo claims is that—on the assumption that philosophers are unable to come
to any definite conclusions about personal identity—our best theoretical considerations
are insufficient to decide the question of what referents to assign to ‘person B’ and ‘you’
(as used in the relevant context), and that they are therefore insufficient to decide the
question of what sorts of distinctions to use in representing the way the world is when
the torturing takes place. To my mind, at least, this is an eminently sensible conclusion.
(Semantic ascent can make all the difference: compare the claim that you are different
people in different contexts with the claim that ‘you’ refers to different people in different
contexts.)
3.3 Carnapian Rayo v. Mainstream Rayo (Hofweber)
In the preceding section I did my best to defend Carnapian Rayo against a certain kind
of challenge. It seems to me, however, that the main theses of the book are independent
of whether Carnapian Rayo’s views are ultimately sustainable. Hofweber disagrees. He
thinks that ‘[i]f there is an objective logical space, and if ‘just is’-statements are just like
other statements, then much of what is to come [in the book] doesn’t really make much
progress over the mainstream.’ (p. xx)
To illustrate the point, he introduces Mainstream Rayo. Unlike Carnapian Rayo, who
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‘rides a motorcycle with no helmet on’, Mainstream Rayo is so decidedly unadventurous
that when he ‘wants to do something far out he listens to an unusual interpretation
of Beethoven.’ In an effort not to come across as boring, however, Mainstream Rayo
‘sometimes puts labels on common views that make them seem more radical than they
are.’ (p. xx) For instance, he will sometimes restate the perfectly conventional claim that
‘necessarily, the number of the dinosaurs is zero just in case there are no dinosaurs’ as a
‘just is’-statement: ‘for the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no
dinosaurs’. But for Mainstream Rayo the ‘just is’ locution is just for show: it leads to
no interesting philosophical conclusions.
Hofweber thinks that unless one is prepared to interpret me as Carnapian Rayo, it is
hard to see how the book could deliver much by way of a novel philosophical position.
For unless one follows Carnapian Rayo in rejecting the idea that it makes sense to speak
of an objectively correct conception of logical space, my ‘view will likely end up like
Mainstream Rayo’s’ (p. xx)
I certainly agree with Hofweber that one gets a much more radical version of the
proposal if one interprets me as Carnapian Rayo. But I don’t think one should conclude
from this that the only alternative to Carnapian Rayo is Mainstream Rayo. It seems to
me that the two central doctrines of the book are weak enough not to require Carnapian
Rayo’s views about objective truth but strong enough to go beyond Mainstream Rayo’s
unadventurous commitments. The first doctrine is compositionalism, which we discussed
in Section 1.1. The second doctrine is the claim that one’s views about which explanatory
and justificatory demands should be treated as legitimate are shaped by the ‘just is’-
statement one accepts.
I offered an example of the second doctrine in Section 2.5. Let me mention another.
Suppose that we take the following ‘just is’ statement to be true:
[Dinosaurs]
For the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs.
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Then, the basic theoretical framework of the book entails that we should dismiss the
following line of questioning as illegitimate:
I can see that there are no dinosaurs. But I would like to know how one could
ever be justified in believing that a certain further fact obtains: the fact that
the number of the dinosaurs is zero. And if it turns out that this further fact
does indeed obtain, I would like to understand why it obtains. Why isn’t it
instead the case that there are no numbers?
The second doctrine delivers the result that this line of reasoning carries a false presup-
position. For it assumes that there is a further fact where there is none: the fact that
there are no dinosaurs is already the fact that the number of the dinosaurs is zero. So
there is no need to justify the claim that the supposed further fact obtains, and there is
no need to explain why it obtains if it does.
In contrast, it is consistent with Mainstream Rayo’s views that there is a further fact,
and that the line of questioning ought to be taken seriously. It seems to me that this
is an unhappy place to end up, because efforts to answer the relevant explanatory and
justificatory demands have led to all sorts of intractable problems.28 On the other hand,
I think that someone who rejects the demands as illegitimate is in a position to develop
an attractive philosophy of mathematics.29
In any case, I might as well reveal that I am, in fact, Carnapian Rayo.
28A canonical statement of these problems is in Benacerraf, ‘Mathematical Truth’ .
29The Construction of Logical Space, Ch. 3 and 4.
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